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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 10-3170 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CHRISTOPHER ALAN BROWN, 
        Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
Division of St. Croix 
D.C. Criminal No. 10-cr-00014-001 
(Honorable Anne E. Thompson and Honorable Raymond L. Finch) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 April 11, 2011 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed:  June 9, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Christopher Brown was indicted by a grand jury in the U.S. Virgin Islands of one 
count of aggravated identity theft during and in relation to the offense of bank fraud. 
After a bench trial, Brown was convicted and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and 
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four years’ supervised release. On appeal, Brown argues the counterfeit identification he 
used was insufficient to support his conviction. We will affirm. 
I. 
 In January 2008, police arrested Brown and his girlfriend, Heather Golden, in 
Houston, Texas after they presented a counterfeit check to purchase jewelry. Brown and 
Golden had schemed to defraud multiple jewelry stores by buying jewelry using 
fraudulent checks. After release on bail, Brown and Golden fled to the mobile home of 
Golden’s stepfather, Scott Nevins, in Austin, Texas. In Austin, Brown and Golden met 
Jason Brooks, who was renting a trailer owned by Robert Storey, Golden’s family friend 
and a resident of St. Croix. Storey’s trailer is located on Nevins’s property. After 
spending one night in Nevins’s home, Brown took without permission Brooks’s expired 
Texas driver’s license from the glove compartment of Brooks’s unlocked truck.  
 Brown and Golden subsequently fled to St. Croix. Before leaving Texas, they 
purchased a counterfeit Arkansas identification card. The false card displayed the name 
“Jason Brooks” and Brooks’s birth date as obtained from his driver’s license, along with 
a fabricated address and Brown’s photograph. In St. Croix, Brown and Golden resumed 
their scheme. They used a check-making software program to print checks in the name of 
“Jason Brooks” that displayed account and routing numbers taken without permission 
from the payroll checks of the business “Cheeseburgers in Paradise.” Brown and Golden 
used these checks to buy goods at stores in both St. Croix and St. Thomas, including 
$10,170 worth of jewelry from H. Stern Jewelry Store (H. Stern) in St. Thomas. For the 
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H. Stern purchase, Brown identified himself using the counterfeit Arkansas identification 
card. On April 17, 2008, Brown attempted to use a fraudulent check to buy jewelry from 
the store Cruzan Gold in St. Croix. The vendor alerted police, who arrested Brown. 
 Brown and Golden were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 with conspiracy to 
commit bank fraud in connection with their scheme to defraud H. Stern. Brown was also 
charged with aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(A) for assuming the 
identity of another individual during the transaction. Brown and Golden initially pleaded 
guilty, but Brown withdrew his plea. 
 In February 2010, Brown was charged with forty-five counts of various offenses. 
These charges included possession of contraband while incarcerated, conspiracy to 
possess counterfeit securities, and substantive bank fraud, as well as the aforementioned 
conspiracy to commit bank fraud and aggravated identity theft. Brown pleaded guilty to 
all except aggravated identity theft.  
 On March 30, 2010, a federal grand jury indicted Brown of one count of 
aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1) and 2. Following a 
bench trial on April 6, 2010, the District Court convicted Brown. On July 15, 2010, the 
court sentenced Brown to two years’ imprisonment and four years’ supervised release to 
run consecutively. Brown timely appealed.
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II. 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 On appeal, Brown contends the government produced insufficient evidence to 
sustain his conviction for aggravated identity theft.
2
 He claims the counterfeit 
identification he used was insufficient to identify a specific person. We disagree.  
 To prove aggravated identity theft, the government had to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Brown “knowingly transfer[red], possesse[d], or use[d], without 
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).3 
A “means of identification” consists of: 
any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any 
other information, to identify a specific individual, including any- 
 
(A) name, social security number, date of birth, official State or 
government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien 
registration number, government passport number, employer or 
taxpayer identification number; 
 
(B) unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or 
iris image, or other unique physical representation; 
 
(C) unique electronic identification number, address, or routing 
code; or 
 
                                                 
2
 Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, “we review the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the government.” United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 684 (3d 
Cir. 1999). We will affirm “if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 
187 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3
 The aggravated identity theft statute provides: “Whoever, during and in relation to any 
felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, 
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in addition to 
the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 
years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Section 1028A(c)(5) defines “felony violation 
enumerated in subsection (c)” to include “any provision contained in chapter 63 (relating 
to mail, bank, and wire fraud)” among qualifying felony violations. Brown pleaded guilty 
to bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344.  
5 
 
(D) telecommunication identifying information or access device (as 
defined in section 1029(e))[.] 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7). 
 Brown argues United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2008), supports 
reversal of his conviction. In Mitchell, the defendant selected a corresponding first and 
last name, city and state of residence, and year of birth from a phone book to create a 
false license. The counterfeit license contained no middle name and a fabricated house 
number, street name, month and day of birth. The court found these “non-unique 
identifiers . . . were a hopeless muddle of matching and non-matching information,” and 
“the non-matching identifiers . . . were much more specific.” Id. at 236. Furthermore, the 
defendant appropriated no “unique identifier” that might identify an individual alone, 
such as a social security or identification number. Id.  
 Brown contends his counterfeit Arkansas identification card did not display 
Brooks’s middle name, Brooks’s Texas address, or Brooks’s individual identification 
number, all of which appear on Brooks’s Texas driver’s license. Brown argues these 
distinctions and omissions render the fraudulent Arkansas identification card incapable of 
constituting a “means of identification” of the Jason Brooks from whom Brown stole a 
Texas license.  
 When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient 
evidence for the District Court to conclude Brown knowingly used Brooks’s “means of 
identification” and to convict Brown of aggravated identity theft. Brooks was an 
individual known to Brown whose driver’s license Brown stole. From the first and last 
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name, as well as the day, month, and year of birth on that license, Brown fashioned a 
counterfeit identification card he used to commit bank fraud. This information is more 
complete and specific to Brooks than the information found insufficient by the Fourth 
Circuit in Mitchell. Section 1028(d)(7) requires Brown to knowingly use information that 
constitutes a “means of identification” of a specific individual to support a conviction for 
aggravated identity theft. The District Court reasonably concluded the matching names 
and birth date on Brooks’s genuine Texas driver’s license and Brown’s counterfeit 
Arkansas identification card did just that.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
